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Practical reasoning often aims at demonstrable knowledge. Instrumental reasoning
in particular seeks to determine that certain actions are effective means to some end
in view. In this respect it is like scientific deliberation, which may begin in
uncertainty or disagreement about where the truth resides, but resolution should be
possible when the evidence has been collected and empirically assessed. Global
warming is now a generally accepted fact. Similar assessments can often determine
whether public policies have served their purpose. In such matters, collective
deliberation satisfies ideas of rationality that expect inquiry to conclude in
discovering the truth about a contested issue. In matters of moral and political
intuition, though, deliberation may fail to justify the conclusion that one position is
correct to the exclusion of others. It will recognize some competing views to be
equally reasonable. Contrary to the assumption of rational uniqueness that cogent
deliberation concerning our normative beliefs should ultimately converge on one
most reasonable belief, inquiry displays fundamental normative pluralism.
Liberalism provides a good context for evaluating these propositions. As a
dominant political faith it shows how cultural assumptions may constrain one’s
intuitive options – in a liberal society it is difficult to view slavery as other than
deeply offensive – but that is far from saying that it represents the moral truth. If the
following arguments are sound, it can only display moral reasonableness. The
rationalistic aim of convergence upon the facts is not appropriate in the case of
moral and political convictions, for which reasoned discourse is best displayed in
ongoing discussion rather than demonstrable conclusions. Of course, even in science
epistemic convergence is an ideal. Agreement about global warming is not
universal: there are deniers who do not regard themselves as irrational. Nevertheless
there are clearly truths about which they may be mistaken. Scientific inquiry can
plausibly claim a progressive direction. Consideration of recent work by Hilliard
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Aronovitch and others will leave the corresponding claim for normative inquiry
more deeply problematical. The factual openness typical of normative deliberation
precludes anything like closure upon the truth. Nonetheless, the reasonableness of
political opinions that have developed over centuries of discussion gives them
ongoing credibility.
1 Practical Disputes: Differences and Disagreements
The fundamental point of this exploration is that normative belief properly aims at
reasonableness rather than truth. In consequence, if disagreements are issues of truth
and falsity then the objects of many arguments are differences that require some
other mode of resolution (if they require it at all). ‘‘Disagreement’’ is not the noun of
choice in typical matters of intuitive dispute, as when people who agree on all the
facts have different intellectual or emotional responses to them.1 For example,
astronomers have disputed whether Pluto is a planet but on this they are better said
to differ than to disagree. Those committed to the status of Pluto as a planet do not
imply that ‘‘Pluto is a planet’’ represents a discovery, for they are promoting a
definition. If the definition is accepted, facts of nature will then decide which bodies
are planets, but the principle of identification rests upon a choice that rests upon no
further decisive fact. As a result, there may be divergences within the astronomical
community or between that community and the general public, but the difference
comes down to informed preferences for the way in which a word is to be used
rather than to a disagreement about reality.
Philosophers sometimes maintain that when disputants make conflicting judg-
ments on the basis of the same factual evidence then one of them must revise their
judgment on pain of irrationality.2 If they are epistemic peers, though, possessing all
the same evidence and being equally able to reason from it, what is the basis of this
requirement? The question is a live issue in epistemology, but it does not arise
where judgments reasonably differ rather than compete as true or false. The issue
then is not rationality but reasonableness and whether recognizing faultless
differences of belief comes at an unacceptable cost. It may appear to in cases of
moral and political conflict but a more benign view can be defended: Many such
conflicts define intelligent options rather than constituting contradictions, implying
the permanence of moral and political differences and warranting philosophical
satisfaction with reasonableness when practical disputes amount to differences
where neither disputant need be mistaken. Learning how to differ without
disagreeing then emerges as a virtue within much practical reasoning.
Acquiring this virtue will include the ability to distinguish reasonable differences
from stubborn commitments. One’s normative beliefs will not be grounded upon
mere preferences as non-cognitivist forms of expressivism suppose. Moral and
1 Of course, one can select a vocabulary in which ‘‘disagreement’’ does play this role, as in Allan
Gibbard, Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 65–68. There is
no ideally perspicuous language.
2 The case is laid out by Peter van Inwagen, ‘‘We’re Right. They’re Wrong,’’ in Richard Feldman and
Ted A. Warfield, eds., Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 10–28.
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political disputants will not simply rationalize the facts in favour of their intuitions.
Instead they will listen to the reasons for competing intuitions and be prepared to
change their mind. This capacity is especially evident on an historical scale.
Consider the belief in human dignity that has become deeply embedded in much
contemporary thinking as part of the ethos of modern liberal societies. A view of all
men as created equal is compelling in such societies because it expresses a
developed sense of respect for the moral worth of other persons. To be sure, the
process of development has taken generations of interpretative discussion. The view
is not now acceptable unless ‘‘all men are created equal’’ clearly refers to all men
and women in virtue of their common humanity. The process of making its practical
meaning explicit includes further issues of scope, such as the age of majority. The
ideas of dignity, equality and moral worth thus belong to a project under
construction as part of an ongoing conversation and developing narrative. The
cogency of these ideas does not arise from pre-established verities but from ‘‘open-
ended reasoning from tradition.’’3 This is a clear example of establishing reasoned
positions from which it is not possible to go back, but close examination of this
reasoning will show that it is not truth-apt discourse.
Simon Blackburn takes another position in suggesting that we know that slavery
is wrong when no further facts will change our minds about it: there is no epistemic
improvement that will lead us to abandon the belief that it is wrong.4 He rightly
notes the difference between certainties of this kind and more tentative commit-
ments, such as favoring a minimum wage. Given more expertise in economics, the
minimum wage is a policy about which one might change one’s mind, so that
suitable intellectual modesty will prevent one from claiming knowledge in this case.
About slavery, by contrast, Blackburn holds that talking about knowledge and truth
can be permitted. However, the philosophical right to truth is not so easily earned. If
Blackburn’s view reflects reasoning from tradition, then it is intellectually
questionable from the standpoint of traditions in which human trafficking is
practiced. Even within the liberal project proclaiming the truth that people are
morally equal is a dubiously strong interpretation of regarding an opinion as
irreversible. One might insist that nothing would change one’s mind about same-sex
marriage but later find that one’s ostensible knowledge had disappeared upon
learning that a son or daughter was gay. In any event, insisting upon the truth of any
normative claim is insufficiently motivated as long as it is possible to strive for
reasonable commitments rather than say that some moral and political norms are
now incontestable objects of knowledge.
A look backward provides a useful context for considering Blackburn’s position.
Imagine that 18th-Century Americans had consented to continue recognizing states’
rights in the matter of slavery and that the South continued to differ from the North
about the practice. Would it be appropriate to suggest that under these
circumstances there was no clear disagreement? The very existence of the
3 Hilliard Aronovitch, ‘‘How Liberals Can Explain the Moral Errors of Past Eras and Answer Bernard
Williams,’’ Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 46, no. 3, 2012, p. 344.
4 Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998),
pp. 306–307.
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American nation arguably depended upon commitment to the proposition that all
men are created equal. While half slave and half free, the nation had a cancer eating
away at that idea within the body politic, showing that issues in conscientious
dispute are not always subject to compromise as if they represented reasonable
differences. Rather, the health of the society depended upon its commitment to
embracing the moral truth about slavery.5 But this cannot be right. There was no
such general social commitment. Rather, in the absence of a universally recognized
truth, there was civil war. The dispute might have been amicably settled in the long
run if it had focused upon clearly factual issues – whether African slaves were
naturally submissive or unequal to their owners in native intelligence, for example –
but settling these issues does not establish the normative position that slavery is a
hateful practice. In a liberal society the jury of public opinion certainly places the
onus of argument on the pro-slavery side: If anything is a moral fact it is that slavery
is wrong. Nevertheless, this is a demanding condition to satisfy. The well-
established openness of recognized facts to alternative normative judgments
warrants philosophical hesitation about claiming truth for any of these judgments.
Fortunately, hesitation exacts no high epistemic price if judgments of right and
wrong can be recognized as reasonable opinions rather than expressions of non-
cognitive preferences. The existence of a legitimate onus can represent superiority
in argument rather than simple political or military success. Expressions of moral
approval and disapproval are then cognitively justified.
Blackburn’s knowledge claims are an apology for ordinary language. If it is all
right as it is, and if it permits speaking of moral truth and knowledge, then so be it.
This defense does seem to sacrifice some philosophical rigor, however. It makes it
challenging to distinguish meta-ethical expressivism from moral realism, for
example. It is therefore worth examining some more theoretically well-founded
attempts to show that moral truths can overcome normative differences. Three such
attempts are especially interesting, particularly because they effectively represent
elements of the liberal project. One (communicative rationalism) is embodied in
procedural accounts of sound practical deliberation, another (discursive non-
naturalism) in a meta-ethical alternative to the cognitivist expressivism defended
here, and a third (moral universalism) in a contrast between ethical beliefs that are
matters of convention and moral beliefs whose content must be regarded as objects
of knowledge. Each of these accounts propounds an epistemically robust conception
of normative reasoning. Their ultimate failure supports satisfaction with normative
reasonableness over moral truth.
Procedural accounts of deliberation build upon the broadly accepted model of
rational discourse that free, discursive, empirical inquiry will eventually lead to
theoretical agreement after exhaustive testing against the describable facts.
Corresponding to this conception of deliberation in scientific communities, a
comparable ideal of practical reasoning holds that legitimate moral and political
discourse occurs only given general commitment to rules of debate that permit
every interested party to take part in deliberation, introduce any proposal, question
5 Compare Garver, For the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character, and the Ethics of Belief
(Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 16.
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any claim and express one’s attitudes and needs.6 Conclusions that depart from this
thoroughgoing democratic egalitarianism – for example, decisions that would leave
a nation half slave and half free – then mark obvious defects of discursive
deliberation. The procedural norms thereby constrain unjust outcomes by recog-
nizing basic moral truths that identify human freedom and equality as presuppo-
sitions of sound deliberative commitments. We should therefore postulate certain
well-founded moral agreements that need only be made explicit in order for them to
constrain the inevitable wealth of ethical difference that a pluralistic society has to
manage.
An obvious difficulty for this communicative rationalism is that its procedural
ambitions are compromised by the substantive commitments that build in moral
agreement. The practice of discourse is taken to presuppose the obligation that all
participants be respected as equals in virtue of possessing human dignity: ‘‘All
persons as such possess a dignity we are obligated to respect and promote.’’7 This
argument fails because human dignity justifies universal respect but appealing to the
dignity of every person expresses an article of political faith rather than a
demonstrable truth that could enable discursive procedures to extend their epistemic
success to moral as well as scientific agreement. (To be sure, a similar argument
could be made against scientific discourse, for which alternative theories can be
consistent with all the known facts, but that does not make the case for a procedural
approach to moral truth.)
The question-begging element of communicative rationalism is addressed by the
second discursive approach to the resolution of moral differences. A venerable
theory of interpersonal moral agreement develops truth-based conditions for
normative belief by construing justifying reasons as non-natural facts. All forms of
this theory lead straightforwardly to a robust normative realism. As for other non-
naturalisms the facts are to be known through a kind of intuition, but while
intuitions notoriously differ the thesis need not prove epistemically barren. To the
contrary, it should provide an appealing explication of the way in which the liberal
ethos has developed through centuries of ongoing conversation, yielding an
egalitarian narrative that is capable of correcting prejudiced personal intuitions.
Generations of development have given the concept of human dignity an
incontestable core of application – to men and women, young and old, black and
white – that rules out certain discriminatory practices as unquestionably offensive.
A discursive non-naturalism thereby becomes an appealing route to the moral facts
that provide the foundation for liberal society.
A view of this kind shows how moral intuitions can represent normative truths
through a form of seeing rather than inference. Liberal perceptions are refined and
clarified by reliable processes of deliberative development in contrast to judgments
that express personal preferences or arise from evolutionary adaptations bearing no
6 Ju¨rgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1990), p. 89.
7 Walter Okshevsky, ‘‘On the Epistemic Grounds of Moral Discourse and Moral Education: An
Examination of Ju¨rgen Habermas’s ‘Discourse Ethics,’’’ in Chris Higgins, ed., Philosophy of Education
2004 (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 2005), pp. 177–178.
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resemblance to any moral realities.8 Cultural reflection yields definitive criteria of
evaluation that are cognitively robust. Unfortunately, though, in seeking to
determine normative reality through a particular ethos, it will seem necessary to
develop a relativistic conception of truth or conclude that one culture’s set of ethical
judgments is uniquely attuned to the moral facts. The first of these positions
conflicts with the principle of rational uniqueness and will not be further considered
here. The second is a version of moral universalism that warrants closer attention.
The next section therefore explores a possible distinction between ethical beliefs
that cannot do better than reasonableness and moral beliefs that successfully claim
universal truth or validity.
The point of the ensuing discussion is to consider the possibility of epistemically
truth-apt beliefs in matters of morality in contrast to the disputable beliefs typical of
ethical commitment. After all, there is nothing on the face of moral discourse that
renders it obviously prone to irresolvable conflicts. Where the norms of public
reason require all views to be heard, all issues to be thoroughly discussed and
consensus to be sought, it can be responsibly doubted that moral disagreement is a
permanent feature of human existence. Ethical difference can remain. Practical
reasonableness and rationality in a pluralistic society would then conform to a
simple analogy: Ethics is to morality as difference is to disagreement. Developing
the distinction between moral agreement and disagreement and ethical consensus
and difference will sharpen this proposal. In the end, though, moral universalism
will fall short of establishing the possibility of normative knowledge.
2 Ethics and Morality
Assume for purposes of argument that norms of good reasoning mark unresolved
moral disagreements as failures of practical thinking. For this assumption to be
plausible its scope must be constrained by distinguishing a recognized class of
differences from disagreements, leaving room for some ongoing diversity of
judgment. Characterizing the relevant differences as ethical rather than moral
implies that moral consensus is consistent with ethical pluralism. Like languages,
ethical systems tend to diverge. Human creativity and critical acumen perturb
established ways of life and patterns of commitment, challenging convention and
creating diversity in manners, modes of dress, dietary habits, religious observances,
familial pieties and customary behavior generally. In a competitive engagement
between alternative customs, it is not to be expected or even desired that
deliberative discussion will resolve the differences. No single ethos has a monopoly
on the good life or legislates for all humanity. Ethical differences thus distinguish
various individuals and communities whose diverse ways of life have a presumption
of permissibility within the constraint of morality, about whose universal
requirements alone should agreement be expected. Reasonable ethical differences
do not then support moral relativism.




Most ethical ideals that endure over generations can be coherently stated and
attractively described. Various ways of life are suitable objects of pride and
admiration. At the same time, as modern parents often find in commending social
practices to their children, particular ways of life can prove difficult to justify when
others challenge them. Mill therefore invited us to recognize of our own ethical
worldviews and the dissenting visions of other people that ‘‘mere accident has decided
which of these numerous worlds is the object of [our] reliance.’’9 The contingency of
many normative commitments does not disturb our comfort within an ethical
community where we can identify actions and lives that warrant esteem for nobility
and shame at dishonour, but gaining a critical perspective makes us rightly hesitate to
suppose that we believe as we do because our beliefs are better grounded than those
supporting alternative ways of life. Ethical pluralism clearly displays the contestabil-
ity of beliefs that require the support of engaging narratives to which there can be
reasonable rivals. In contrast to great bodies of belief in mathematics and science that
are rarely subject to significant disagreement, disputes flourish when there is no
decisive evidence for judgment. Arguably, there is no such thing as faultless
disagreement, but no-fault differences remain when all of the describable facts have
been taken into account. As a result, some people may confidently do certain things
that others would avoid but can recognize as situated within a plausible story of
responsible decision. Even if they deplore those things, they can recognize them as
morally permissible. The important question is how to understand the relationship
between ethical acceptability and moral requiredness. Recognizing normative
contingencies and hesitating to assume that one’s ethical beliefs are better grounded
than others’ are philosophical virtues, but they do not rule out distinguishing between
what is conventionally acceptable and what is morally correct.
The tidy way of stating the distinction is to say that morality defines the limits of
permissible pluralism: it identifies a set of obligations addressed to all persons
everywhere. For example, Mill’s defence of liberty is consistent with great personal
and social differences, but only within the constraint of the harm principle, which is
universally binding. The condition of universality casts morality as an impartial
authority independent of particular worldviews and ways of life. Given this
conceptual marker, one can propose a clear line between morality and ethics. The
former will include matters subject to rational and universal agreement, including
such general principles as seeking the greatest good for the greatest number and
treating human beings as ends in themselves, together with further principles for
resolving conflicts when they occur between these primary requirements. Since
these ideals are integral to liberalism, it can claim to be the ethos that comes closest
to moral truth. More generally, ethical life and many of its differences can arguably
be accommodated within these deontological and utilitarian moral constraints.
This proposal rules out cognitivist expressivism in moral theory or restricts it to
ethical considerations, but the supporting rationale represents a useful distinction
between ethical particularity and moral universality too tidily. The problem can be
seen by hesitating to accept the universalistic conception of morality uncritically and
focussing first upon the emotional markers that can be used to distinguish ethics and
9 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Alburey Castell (Northbrook, Ill.: AHM Publishing, 1947), p. 18.
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morality. Whereas ethical ways of life are characterized by pride and admiration
among their practitioners, the utilitarian and deontological principles characteristic of
contemporary conceptions of morality are associated with emotions of beneficence
and rectitude. Moral psychologists observe that aptitude for the latter sentiments
enables us to respond to others sympathetically and to respect our equals, and social
scientists explain this make-up by noting the adaptive benefits of intuitive cooperation:
Inspired by natural benevolence we readily assent to principles of supporting others’
welfare; and inspired by respect for others we readily avoid treating them as tools for
our purposes. Against this background the distinction between ethics and morality
does not suggest the superior rationality of moral considerations. Rather, the division
corresponds to emotions that resist universalizability and those that permit it. On the
one hand we find communal affections that rest upon comparisons. Pride and
admiration imply distinctions that do not lend themselves to universality, since only
some can excel in any given activity or pursuit. On the other hand we find emotions that
are universalizable, providing avenues of moral concern for the general welfare and
the recognition of human equality. Different parts of the repertoire of human emotions
thus identify the spheres of ethics and morality respectively. Only the moral emotions
are universalizable, but this is no particular distinction because universalizability
differs crucially from universality.
The deliberative resources available in liberal cultures encourage general assent to
universal principles of human welfare and equality, but this is not the unavoidable
agreement that attaches to statements whose truth should be recognized by rational
beings. The attribution of universality represents only one of the possible forms of
moral thinking, which may be extended to all persons as objects of sympathy and
respect but which have usually remained parochially focussed on a limited group.
Most people pity the pains they observe and normally want to avoid causing others to
suffer. Most people respect their social peers and want to deal fairly with them. It is a
further step to avoid harm to all persons and extend the protections of moral
personhood to everyone. The liberal morality that includes universal ascription of
moral personality is a feasible expression of sympathy and respect and one in which
liberal cultures can reasonably take pride. However, the universalisation of these
responses is not compelled by ascertainable facts about sapient or sentient beings.
Rather, universalized beliefs can be understood as the particular form of the moral
commitments sanctioned by our ethical life. As Charles Taylor observes, ‘‘the
premises of … moral reasoning can … appear to be of a quite different provenance
from those that deal with qualitative contrast,’’ but ‘‘[w]hat is really going on is that
some forms of ethical reasoning are being privileged over others because in our
civilization they come less into dispute or look easier to defend.’’10 Bernard Williams
can be read as making a similar point in characterizing morality as ‘‘a particular
development of the ethical.’’11
10 Charles Taylor, ‘‘The Diversity of Goods,’’ in Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 241. Taylor’s comment is part of a defence of ‘‘languages of
contrast’’ that tend to get short shrift in utilitarianism and Kantianism.
11 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), p. 6. Williams does
not attempt to define what counts as an ethical consideration but treats ethics as a broad notion against
which to situate the special, modern system of morality.
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Taylor and Williams suggest nice ways of questioning the rationalistic ambitions
of moral universalism. Without going deeply into their detailed positions, their
observations permit linking these ambitions to sympathy and respect, making them
objects of cognitive assessment without implying that this assessment will display
an inherently progressive direction. Aronovitch, to the contrary, suggests that
looking more closely at the conversation of modernity discloses resources that
support this direction: Analogical reasoning in particular explains and justifies the
moral commitments liberals uphold. Properly employed, such reasoning addresses
‘‘past errors such as the acceptance of slavery’’ by remedying ‘‘an intellectual
deficiency, whereby persons or situations that are relevantly similar are judged
differently, and a moral deficiency of due sympathy for others as human beings is
absent.’’12 Richmond Campbell and Victor Kumar similarly suggest that liberal
‘‘intuitions about the moral status of women, persons of color, and other groups that
historically have been treated as unworthy of respect’’ are supported by ‘‘consis-
tency reasoning’’ as ‘‘a mechanism that functions to resolve practical conflict among
our emotion-infused moral judgments.’’13
These observations certainly show that analogies give reasons, and these reasons
can be generally convincing after political struggles for an extension of sympathy
and respect have been won, but it would be a mistake to conflate hard-won social
gains with an inherent direction for reasonable opinion. Almost anything can be
likened to anything in some respect, leaving the judgment that they are relevantly
similar logically open to question. Analogical reasoning differs in this way from
formal inference, where arguments about superficial comparisons do not properly
arise. Moreover, in so far as moral judgments are emotion-infused, they share the
contestability of analogical reasons, and such contests can be settled in different
ways. Liberals do not know whether the struggles of women for equality in Islamic
societies will be successful. Even within liberal cultures the debatable scope of
universal inclusion is evident in questions about merely sentient animals. If
vegetarians convince most people that animals enjoy universal rights, will looking
back to the present reveal the ‘‘past error’’ of eating the flesh of slaughtered
creatures or will it rather express a reasonably revised idea of ‘‘due sympathy’’? The
rise of vegetarianism will settle an issue about the normative standards acceptable to
a set of co-deliberators, but that is not to say that certain ethical beliefs have become
moral knowledge that all rational agents must accept. At any given time ethical
solidarity may hide potential normative differences, but when they emerge there is
no way of confining reasonableness within the mold of truth. In short, the attempt to
identify universal moral propositions recognized as true by ideally rational agents
does not hold much promise of success.
The practical expressions of this disappointment include a form of intellectual
modesty when normative differences complicate the practical concerns of life.
Suppose that there is need to settle a dispute about public policy, such as whether to
countenance human euthanasia. Even if there is ethical consensus on a principle of
12 Aronovitch, ‘‘How Liberals Can Explain the Moral Errors of Past Eras,’’ op. cit., p. 344.
13 Richmond Campbell and Victor Kumar, ‘‘Moral Reasoning on the Ground,’’ Ethics, vol. 122, no. 2,
2012, pp. 274–275 and 300.
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universal human worth and the implication that innocent persons should not be
unnecessarily harmed, it does not determine how to assign harms to permanently
unconscious people or terminally ill people who want to die. Rather than supposing
that there is a truth of this matter, it is possible to accept a political solution without
compromising one’s conscience by acceding to an unreasonable decision. In this
sense it is not a mistake to submit one’s considered judgment to the majority. Doing
so would be unacceptable if political minorities were expected to conclude that they
were mistaken, but that would imply that they regarded their practical judgments as
true. They should not do this if reasonable commitment is comprised of considered
intuitions that others may dispute. One may feel that permanently comatose persons
should be protected, but intellectual modesty should enable one to live with the
alternative decision, just as one can live with other choices one would not make
oneself. Political acceptability will of course be easier if ethical pluralism takes
institutional forms that free minorities from unnecessary restrictions on the exercise
of their beliefs. For example, separate hospitals might be able to publish different
policies on euthanasia, each expressing the practices favored by their different
ethical constituencies. Similar reflections should apply to many other examples of
issues that require political resolution. The underlying point is that the epistemic
properties of intuitive belief support the virtue of ethical compromise. Such a
compromise is neither a strategic modus vivendi nor convergence on the truth. It is a
practice made acceptable by recognizing the reasonableness of different positions.14
H. J. Leland and Han van Wietmarschen use the concept of intellectual modesty
to refer to ‘‘a matter of how a citizen understands the intellectual resources and
capabilities of those with whom she disagrees.’’15 Reasonable citizens recognize
that others endorse intuitions that conflict with their own and see no prospect of
convergence upon a single answer. Since such modesty is consistent with the themes
of the present discussion, it is interesting to consider whether it is conceptually
sustainable given that people generally are at most tempered pluralists. Even very
tolerant popular opinion resists accommodating some marginal ethical stances as
reasonable. In spite of our freedom of thought and discussion, well-acculturated
members of liberal societies may find it difficult to explore some things open-
mindedly. Discussions of taboos or abominations – such as cannibalism, paedophilia
and slavery – are acceptable only in fictional, historical or anthropological contexts,
not as live options in modern societies. No one who advocates human slavery is
likely to be worth listening to, precluding talk of alternatives here and suggesting
that some ways of life must be regarded as false for purposes of action. A few
benighted individuals may defend sex with consenting children or dining on the
dead as victimless practices, but they lie outside acceptable society, whose
boundaries define limits beyond which odious commitment is not tolerated and may
be viewed as truly wrong.
14 Andrew Lister, ‘‘Public Reason and Moral Compromise,’’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 37,
no. 1, 2007, p. 18.
15 Or, in the language of this essay, ‘‘differs.’’ See R. J. Leland and Han van Wietmarschen,




An important issue lies here. The jury of public opinion identifies reasonable
people according to prevailing norms of thought and behavior. These norms, we
have observed, are products of a long cultural conversation. They are provisionally
fixed points but remain open-ended. In consequence, they define what will be
tolerated but are also subject to challenge by reformers and dissenters who seek to
amend them. This possibility is grounds for the philosophical modesty expressed in
finding ‘‘not tolerated’’ and ‘‘truly wrong’’ an awkward conjunction of ideas.
Abominations have a checkered history. People have differed and will continue to
differ about what practices are hateful, what makes them hateful and why. There are
worlds in which slavery has been supported by supposing the system to be beneficial
for all participants. This position is incredible in modern liberal societies, where
reasons justifying hatred of the practice have become inherent in popular wisdom;
but because justifying reasons can always be resisted by a dissenting faction, the
risk of civil conflict can never be entirely removed. As a result, the refuge of truth is
difficult to resist, but the argument of this essay is that the philosophical analysis of
practical reasoning has not earned this sanctuary. It is not facts of human dignity and
equality that justify liberal opinion so much as informed sympathy with the victims
of human trafficking, respect for all one’s fellow human beings, and love of
neighbor. Good liberal reasoning is best encouraged philosophically by offering
arguments and analogies that give reasons for universalizing these sentiments and
by explicating the meta-ethical grounds of intellectual modesty. It is best
encouraged politically through liberal civic education and inclusive public
deliberation. As long as conversation continues, disputes do not become states of
war and leave compromise open. The assumption that moral disputes mark failures
of practical reasoning is nevertheless mistaken, for there is no sustainable boundary
between ethical difference and moral disagreement.
3 Conclusion
Jane Austen’s ironic reference to ‘‘a truth universally acknowledged’’ is a shrewd
reminder that ethical imperatives are tied to particular forms of moral life.16 The
philosophical lesson is to be cautious about assuming that moral truths are the
grounds of sound action. This assumption is challenged by ethical intuitions that
resist complete factual analysis and empirical demonstration. In matters of practical
reasoning, reasonableness is often the best object of our reliance.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
16 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice [first published in 1813]: ‘‘It is a truth universally acknowledged that
a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife.’’
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